From underground cult to public policy for citizens by Lee, Kwang Suk
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts
2006
From underground cult to public policy for
citizens: democratizing an open source artifact at a
policy level in South Korea
Kwang-Suk Lee
University of Wollongong, kslee@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
The article was orignally presented at the International Communication Association Conference (division of Communication Law and
Policy), 25-30 May 2005, New York. Then, it was published as Lee, Kwang-Suk (2006) From underground cult to public policy for
citizens: democratizing an open source artifact at a policy level in South Korea, Info: The journal of policy, regulation, and strategy for
telecommunications 8(1), 2006, 4–15. Copyright Emerald 2006. Original journal article available here
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    1 
 
From Underground Cult to Public Policy for Citizens: Democratizing an Open 





This study explores the feasible use of free and open source software (FOSS) at a policy level in 




Based on participatory democratic theory, this paper suggests that the normative role of the state 
is as a public mediator in the development of an IT infrastructure encouraging greater freedom of 
choice and the establishment of an electronic environment — such as the community-based use 
of software technology — for citizens to use easily and freely.  
 
Findings 
South Korean policymakers have explored FOSS as a kind of a political metaphor: At the 
international level, FOSS offers a rare opportunity to free the country from its technological 
dependence on transnational software vendors. At the national level, it is an engine for 
technological innovation and for market competition. However, the market or business paradigm 
has dominated most discussions of FOSS in Korea. As a result, the economic paradigm of FOSS 
is vulnerable and could easily surrender to the proprietary logic of the software market.  
 
Originality/Value 
This study describes how the Korean government must maximize the societal benefits of FOSS 
within the public sector in order to reduce reliance on proprietary software and open the 
developmental path to alternative technologies. 
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From Underground Cult to Public Policy for Citizens: Democratizing an Open 
Source Artifact at a Policy Level in South Korea* 
 
Introduction 
The “free and open source software” (FOSS) movement is not considered a “cult” in the 
computer world any longer. Linus Tovalds, who developed the kernels for the Linux operating 
system, has become a guru well known in both the underground world of hackers and the 
business market (e.g., Tovalds is featured on the cover of the November 2003 special edition of 
Wired, a techno-utopian magazine). Microsoft’s top executives consider Linux, whose total users 
were estimated at 18 million as of May 1, 2004 (see Linux Counter, http://counter.li.org), a 
significant adversary. Popular open software programs like Linux, Apache (a Web server 
application), Perl (a programming language), and Sendmail (a mail handling program) have 
grown robust enough to compete with Microsoft software.  
        In recent years, the discussion surrounding FOSS has focused almost exclusively on the 
success of FOSS in the capitalist marketplace. In South Korea, most policymakers considering 
FOSS have been uninterested in its social and public implications and have reduced its value to 
that of merely a market incentive for business upturn. Although FOSS has recently been 
regarded as competitive software for reviving national or international markets, Korean officials 
have not seriously considered reducing dependency on Microsoft technology or adopting FOSS 
for the purpose of improving the social welfare of citizens and reducing the digital gap in a 
significant way. Notably, no economic approaches to FOSS in Korea have explicitly embraced 
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direct subsidies or government intervention to support open source software developers. The 
neo-classical idea of a neutral government presupposes that policies favoring FOSS over 
proprietary software would disrupt the software ecosystem, and that government, therefore, 
should always be neutral, except in cases of radical market fluctuation (see Hahn, 2003). Those 
who argue for removing the public role of government, however, would in practice favor the 
monopolies and the private property of the rich over publicly-based equal access to the 
information society. 
        Given these conditions in Korea, the purpose of the present study is twofold: one purpose 
is to explore policies of the Korean government that could support FOSS and avoid the market 
failure caused by vendor dependency on Microsoft; the other is to emphasize the social and 
public implications of FOSS, rather than its new market benefits, which may be wholly 
concentrated on megacorporations. In essence, I argue that FOSS should be considered as a 
public resource for encouraging citizens’ social freedom, a resource that confers new choices on 
software users, who have been entirely alienated from the software development process.   
         
The Philosophy of Freedom in FOSS 
The concept of “free software” was shaped by the philosophy of Richard M. Stallman, a founder 
of the Free Software Foundation. His term “free software” was not meant to denote lack of cost, 
but rather lack of restriction (Pavlicek, 2000, p. 19). Stallman puts the emphasis on freedom from 
control by another; his standard explanation is “free as in free speech, not free beer.” This use of 
the term “free” refers to four kinds of freedom for users of the software: the freedom to use, to 
modify, to redistribute, and to release modifications to the public. To enjoy these freedoms, 
access to the source code is a precondition (Stallman, 2002, p. 41).  
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        One misunderstanding concerning free and open source software is that it is not protected 
by copyright and that it falls in the public domain. The actual licensing mechanism of the FOSS 
lies under the market system and its legal authorities. As an intentional contrast to the concept of 
copyright, Stallman calls his method for making a program free “copylefting” (p. 89). Instead of 
putting software in the public domain uncopyrighted, free software is copylefted, because if the 
software is released into the public domain without protection, it could be misappropriated for 
developing a proprietary product.  
 The free software movement has given rise to a movement based on “open source” 
software. In contrast to Stallman’s philosophy, which is based on the moral and ethical 
imperative of producing free software, the open source movement focuses on the pragmatic 
benefits that sharing code can provide for creating better software as well as for escaping the risk 
of so-called “lock-in” associated with a single-company technology such as that of Microsoft. 
Popularized by Eric S. Raymond (1999), the concept of open source software stresses aspects 
such as the high reliability, quality, and flexibility of the resulting programs as the primary 
motivation for developing such software. Raymond’s open source initiative is seen as a more 
business-friendly concept than the free software movement, which is closer to the political idea 
of challenging a proprietary counterpart that produces closed software and embeds its own bells 
and whistles in its versions of the software. 
        The popular view of FOSS as a market-based initiative has emerged from the relative 
prominence of the open source concept over the free software concept. Raymond’s market-
centered approach is seen in his use of the terms “cathedral” and “bazaar” (1999, pp. 27-78). He 
metaphorically equates the cathedral model to the closed proprietary world and compares it with 
the bazaar model, the Linux world of open communities. The term “bazaar” not only indicates 
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the intellectual collaboration involved in an open process, free from any external control 
(Roberts, 2001, pp. 21-23), but also expresses the desire to influence the business market and 
thus to forge FOSS in a way responsive to market mechanisms. 




Free Software Foundation 
Egalitarian viewpoint 
Freedom of information 
Political & Social approach 
Software Policy for public welfare 
Eric Raymond 
Open Source Initiative 
Utilitarian viewpoint 
Market incentive 
Economic (market-driven) approach 
SW Policy for market competition  
 
As shown in Table l, both the free and the open source concepts would restrain the dominant 
proprietary trends on both the societal and the economic policy levels. If the radical idea of free 
software is applied well in the public sector, it could increase transparency and public rights to 
information. The application of free software should increase the ability of the government’s 
information systems to interoperate and ensure the continued availability of information (Seiferth, 
1999, p. 57). Meanwhile, the market-friendly idea of open source software could be used as an 
efficient stimulus to support a competitive software market by removing market barriers to 
software ventures. The market-driven open source model, however, is still vulnerable to attack 
by the oligopolistic software companies, which are based on closed software code. 
   Comparing the real world differences between the two methods of licensing, it is clear 
that Stallman’s idea of copylefting by means of a General Public License (GPL) is closest to the 
model of information as part of the public goods. It is also based on the public domain approach 
— the non-proprietary principle that the source code of program cannot be owned. Raymond’s 
open source initiative, as evidenced by the open license to the Apache server, has a much weaker 
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protection of the public domain than the GPL (Fuggetta, 2003). A GPL requires that modified 
versions of the original software also be made available to other users on the basis of the 
unlimited openness of source code and thus encourages authors to voluntarily give up their 
private rights on the copyright of software. In contrast, Raymond’s open source license allows 
individuals or corporations to close and privatize the modified part of source code of software.  
The two different kinds of software licenses are clearly distinguished by different levels 
of “openness” of the source code. It is natural, therefore, that Stallman criticizes Raymond’s 
open source license as creating “semi-free programs” and even some “proprietary programs.” He 
worries that the imperfect openness of the modifiable source code will allow the big software 
vendors to appropriate source code in the public domain and privatize it by modifying and 
copyrighting it. Obviously, the open source license model of Raymond has significant 
implications not only for promoting new competitive values within the market but also for 
building a collaborative ethic of customers and content producers in the creative process. Yet the 
intellectual property system could incorporate the upsurge of new alternative licenses within the 
boundaries of the market. It is very clear that open source software can easily be used for 
proprietary purposes and that the open source concept as a market incentive or ethic needs to be 
redesigned using a socially conscious approach to free software. 
 
Signpost to an Alternative Path: The “1-24 Computer Disaster”  
In South Korea, FOSS policies have only emerged in the last few years. Momentum to consider 
making FOSS government policy was generated by the “1-24 Computer Disaster” in 2003. South 
Korea was the nation most affected by the January 24th virus attack. The virus that crippled the 
Internet system, dubbed the “Slammer”, exploited a security flaw in Microsoft’s Web server 
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software. The vulnerability of Microsoft’s software provoked harsh criticism, and since then the 
government has begun to consider alternatives to Microsoft software. At that time, despite the 
availability of patches, Microsoft made it difficult to keep track of its security alerts, so the alerts 
did not get through. In the end, software users could not contain their anger toward self-
contained, monopolistic software technology, and an influential Korean civil rights group, 
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), launched a lawsuit for damages related 
to the Slammer virus. Named in the suit are information service providers, the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC), and Microsoft. The suit was brought on behalf of 
Internet users and commerce companies. 
        Following this incident, the Korean government announced a plan to spend 21.5 billion 
won (US $18.7 million) by 2007 to replace Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Office 
suite with open source alternatives. Thousands of computers in ministries, government-linked 
organizations, and universities — comprising 20 percent of desktop software and 30 percent of 
server software — will be changed to open source software (Myung, 2003). Since the computer 
virus disaster, the MIC seems to have changed direction from dependence on Microsoft towards 
accepting open source software. To government officials, FOSS has gradually become more 
appealing due to the economic incentives it offers both to expand the scale and scope of the 
software market and to reduce acquisition, maintenance, and support costs. The promotion of 
FOSS in the domestic market has also been praised as a kind of patriotism that will help liberate 
the country from a long-term software dependence on other countries.  
        Nevertheless, implementing FOSS policies in Korea remains a complicated problem. The 
domestic software market is estimated as being up to $16 billion, the equivalent of a 2 or 3 
percent share of the world software market (Korean IT Industry Promotion Agency [KIIPA], 
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June 2002). The Korean software market, along with others, has been making a rapid upturn. The 
profitable software market has led the transnational software monopolies to intervene in national 
IT policies more aggressively. For this reason, the introduction of FOSS at the government 
policy level is a controversial and sensitive issue for all the stakeholders involved. The MIC is 
caught in an ambivalent position between skeptical users of Microsoft and the international 
pressure of software monopolies. The ambivalence comes from the vulnerable international 
status of the Korean government, which feels its policies must respect the interests of Microsoft 
and other global vendors[1]. The government’s uncertainty as to whether it is a proponent of 
FOSS or a collaborator with international software vendors could easily become a handicap 
because the opaqueness of its FOSS policies could lose the trust of its citizens. 
 
Software Policy in South Korea 
Korea’s political and legal conservatism has become a crucial factor in determining national 
information policy. Because of this, in the near future government policy based on the market-
driven philosophy of information and technology may promote a limited vision of FOSS 
development aimed simply at increasing the market value of computer software industries by 
using the open source concept. In the end, Korean FOSS policies may succumb to the ideological 
agenda of government and powerful private interests which together promote a patriotic 
discourse of escape from dependency on international vendors and at the same time more 
privatization, leading to a domestic market dominated by proprietary vendors. 
 
International Constraints 
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At the international level, Microsoft and several leading transnational vendors have dominated 
not only the national software market but also most information systems in government 
institutions[2]. National software policies are largely determined by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), or by the agreements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), or by 
other unofficial trade pressures. The U.S. government, in particular, on behalf of its software, 
music, and film industries, has been pressuring newly industrialized economies to enforce 
international treaties that protect copyright and patent (Lee, in press). In Korea, no system of 
intellectual property can escape the pressure of legal copyright agreements involving 
international institutions. The domestic copyright system has succumbed easily to official and 
unofficial pressure from the U.S. for global commerce (Lee, 2005). As a result, the Korean 
government has not yet considered FOSS as a public policy model for all of its citizens.  
        Nevertheless, since the 1-24 Computer Disaster Korea’s heavy dependence on 
transnational vendors has gradually diminished. The market-friendly logic of FOSS has allowed 
policymakers to consider FOSS to be the next generation of software that will vitalize the 
national IT business. In part, the Korean government’s shift to a policy that favors FOSS has 
been fed by the nationalism springing from the anti-American sentiments of younger Koreans. 
The political motivation of citizens has roused national policymakers to review European and 
other Asian FOSS policies. Motivated primarily by a market-driven initiative similar to 
Raymond’s idea of open source software, some government officials have begun to focus on the 
restoration of competitiveness to the global market.  
Yet even though the technological benefits of FOSS are apparent, domestic policies are 
swayed by the market dominance of transnational vendors. For example, at the public hearing on 
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FOSS policy in March 2003, Microsoft harshly criticized the software policy of the Korean 
government[3], arguing that, on the principle of laissez-faire economics, the government should 
not be in the position of picking industry winners (Evans, 2002). That logic presupposes that 
only the marketplace can satisfy actual market needs (see Smith, 2002; Evans & Reddy, 2002). 
Microsoft has made explicit its opposition to the spread of FOSS programs within Korean 
government institutions, and thus the only area in which FOSS can be applied is the small 
portion of the public sector that will not cause friction with leading international software 
vendors. Unfortunately, if FOSS fails to gain market share within the domestic software market 
because of Microsoft’s campaigns of discount, donation, and investment, the proprietary model 
may become the only realistic alternative for software policies.    
 
Governmental Policy Constraints 
For the decade following August 1995, when the parliament passed the Framework Act on 
Informatization Promotion (FAIP, Act No. 4969), the Korean government’s basic policy has 
been oriented toward setting up economic “efficiencies” in the national and global market rather 
than toward citizens’ information welfare and community-based IT development. The Act has 
been used to provide economic momentum to allow the bigger IT businesses to increase their 
market share with the formal support of the Korean government. The FAIP thus meant that the 
government would directly intervene at the policy level into the nascent market of IT industries 
and force them to restructure themselves toward IT competitiveness in both the local and the 
global knowledge market. The ostensible purpose of the FAIP is to improve Korean quality of 
life and to contribute to the development of the national economy, thereby promoting 
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informatization and achieving an advanced information and communications industry 
infrastructure.  
The business-oriented goal of FAIP was further developed in the second policy plan, 
“Cyber Korea 21” (CK21), issued in March 1999. According to the Informatization White Paper 
2002 (NCA, 2002), the policy goal of CK21 is to create a “knowledge-based society”, improving 
“national competitiveness” and “the quality of life to the level of the more advanced nations” 
(p.79). CK21 increased policy support for the IT businesses and encouraged policy goals for 
advanced information and communication economies by setting forth planned guidelines for IT 
growth. Moreover, according to CK21, the quality of life would be improved by the rapidly 
increasing opportunities derived from connection to the commercial broadband Internet made 
possible by the implementation of major electronic networks for e-commerce. It is apparent that 
the government’s policies have overemphasized business-oriented growth policies based on 
values such as “efficiencies”, “competitiveness”, and “productivities”, to the detriment of values 
such as “sustainability”, “public commons”, and “equal opportunities” for the public welfare. 
 The market-initiative has culminated in the most recent version of the government’s IT 
policy, “E-Korea Vision 2006” (EKV06). In the Informatization White Paper 2003 (NCA, 2003), 
EKV06 states that its goal is both to promote the “information society” at the national level and 
to gain “strong ties of international cooperation toward the global information society” (p. 10). 
To do this, EKV06 declares that the government itself must “create a smart government structure 
with high transparency and productivity” (e-government) and should encourage private 
corporations “to strengthen global competitiveness by promoting the informatization of all 
industries” (e-business) and enable citizens “to enhance their ability to utilize information and 
technologies” (e-eduction).  
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 While the policy visions set forth in the e-government and e-business areas can be read as 
expanded and concrete provisions of the previous market-oriented IT policies, EKV06’s addition 
of e-education for citizens seems to be a distinct shift from the policies of CK21 or the FAIP. It 
is notable as the first instance of the Korean government considering at a national policy level 
such public issues as the “information gap” between the information-rich and information-poor 
and between information-alienated regions and information-centered ones. As is typical of the 
bureaucratic approach to the citizenry, the government has restricted its role to inconspicuous 
tasks, such as supplying computers or promoting commercial Internet access, as well as the 
routinizing and rationalizing of electronic services for citizen requests for official documents. 
The focus is on a quantitative approach that emphasizes outward appearance and growth, as seen 
in the dramatic growth of the IT industry, rather than on the “soft” aims of improving the cultural 
ability of citizens to access, use, and recreate information without restraints. 
 
Relevant Legal Issues 
In Korea, computer software is protected for 50 years after its release date, according to the 
“Computer Program Protection Act” (CPPA) enacted in July 2000 (Ch. 2, Sec. 7, Article 3). The 
protection period of 50 years for computer software has a very different significance than it does 
for most other copyrighted material. Since the lifecycle of a given software version is only two 
or three years at best, the protection period of 50 years translates to an unlimited time, since, 
practically speaking, the software will never fall into the hands of the public. It is clear that the 
CPPA is biased towards the rights of authors rather than of users and this bias is embedded in the 
market-driven protection of private rights: 
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The purpose of this law is to protect the rights of software program authors, to assist in 
the just use of programs, and to promote the related industries and technologies in order 
to contribute to the healthy development of the national economy. (Ch. 1, Sec. 1, 
emphasis added) 
 
Increasingly, software companies depend on prohibitive contractual provisions to assert 
and arguably even expand their intellectual property rights in their attempts to gain market 
dominance. Contract law offers a potential conduit through which copyright holders can bolster 
the protection of rights that are unavailable under copyright provisions, and thus the CPPA is a 
result of negotiation between policymakers and software vendors that enables vendors to gain a 
more stable status in the commercial distribution of software. The CPPA can be seen as a policy 
decision to alleviate both the international discontent about the illegal duplication of software 
and the domestic request for a new law to promote the Korean software market.  
In the CPPA there are a small handful of exemptions for such activities as encryption 
research, reverse engineering, and security testing (Section 12, Article 6). It seems miraculous 
that the “reverse engineering” provision survived despite continuing U.S. pressure, including 
pressure through international organizations such as the WTO, ever since the launch of the 
initiative for a sustainable domestic software market. For the Korean government to promote the 
domestic software industries and to compete with the global vendors, the provision needed to be 
defined in the Act. In newly industrialized economies, this kind of controversial provision is 
always caught in a vulnerable position between the multinational forces seeking to expand their 
monopolies and the national goal of promoting the domestic software market. In any case, 
Section 12 of the CPPA does not allow users a wide array of legitimate activities through such 
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safety valves as fair use, the distinction between idea and expression, and third party innovation. 
Instead, the policy goal is to legitimate what would otherwise be illegal software research and 
development by allowing reverse engineering as a legal incentive to nascent or established 
domestic software companies — not to promote users’ rights to fair use. 
In sum, in Korea FOSS is regarded as nothing more than a technological means of 
promoting market efficiencies and competitiveness. With policy being driven by international 
and domestic pressure to protect intellectual property as market-centered policies, it is difficult to 
pursue the alternative path of FOSS independent of market-driven desire. To domestic 
policymakers, the public value of software is negligible or even incompatible with their market-
driven initiatives.  
 
The Power Structure of FOSS Stakeholders  
 
In December 2002, the Korea IT Industry Promotion Agency (KIIPA) published a working 
group report entitled A Policy Report for Open Source Software in South Korea, [4] which was 
sponsored by the Korean Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). The MIC also held 
a public hearing on FOSS policies in March 2003 to collect the opinions of major stakeholders. 
The MIC planned to show examples of the national FOSS project selected from government 
institutions, local congresses, and universities. As regards software acquisition for government 
institutions, the MIC announced that the previous discriminatory policy favoring Microsoft 
Windows and the Officeware suites over FOSS would be eliminated (Kim, 2003). Three 
Northeast Asian countries — South Korea, China, and Japan — signed a deal to develop a FOSS 
system to replace Microsoft Windows (Yang, 2003), marking a major joint step forward for the 
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three economic heavyweights in the region. At the same time, a government project was 
announced to partly replace Microsoft with FOSS in government institutions by 2007. During 
December 4-7, 2003, the MIC also successfully opened a FOSS market exhibition called 
“SoftExpo 2003.” Taken together, these events reflect the rapid change of Korean government 
policy towards the software industry and show that the government has begun to consider FOSS 
as a significant engine for software development.  
Nevertheless, the Korean government, and specifically the MIC, has shown an 
ambivalent attitude towards FOSS, allowing dominant global vendors to exert direct or indirect 
pressure on domestic software policies. For example, the Secretary of the MIC ordered the 
general use of MS PowerPoint software for public briefings of government officials, which 
evoked anger from the anti-Microsoft front. More disturbing, in June 2003, despite the protest of 
civil rights groups, the government appointed a controversial figure who had been CEO of 
Microsoft Korea as the director of the KIIPA, the MIC agency responsible for national software 
policies. These two episodes indicate that the Korean government has no coherent principles for 
establishing FOSS policies. One serious problem the government has is that it depends entirely 
on a market-driven policy. The ambiguity of government policy is likely to continue as long as 
the Microsoft platform is the dominant power in the national market and in government 
institutions. Meanwhile, anti-MS vendors such as IBM and Sun Microsystems, which have led 
the way in the commercialization of and investment in FOSS, have gradually grown in strength. 
Although these anti-MS vendors will not be able to replace the MS market share with theirs for 
some years, they have already become influential stakeholders who can intervene in domestic 
policy formation.     
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        Another noticeable stakeholder is the Korea Linux Council, which consists of members 
of governmental research centers, industry, and universities. Originally planned as a market-
friendly think-tank, the Council has withered away because it has been in conflict with the 
KIIPA’s Assistance Center for Open Source Software, which supports FOSS developers, 
ventures, and distributors. The conflict arose over the question of who has the priority in 
implementing government policies for FOSS business.     
        The remaining stakeholders, those who have emphasized the public development of 
FOSS, have so little political power that it will be difficult for them to challenge either the 
current ambiguous government policies towards FOSS or the business model of FOSS. They 
have not yet sufficiently developed their own policy alternatives for FOSS. The stakeholders in 
this group are GNU Korea (a Korean branch of the Free Software Foundation), the active FOSS 
program developer or user groups, electronic civil rights groups such as the People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy, and the Jinbo Network Center, which is the Internet Network for 
non-governmental organizations and has directly supported citizens’ rights. In short, in the power 
balance among FOSS stakeholders, the business or market model holds a dominant position over 
the application of FOSS to the public and nonprofit sectors in building domestic software policy 
in Korea (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 The power structure in the Korean FOSS policies 
Take in Figure 1 – ref p. 25 
 
 
Learning from Others’ Experiences 
An article in The New York Times (Schenker, 2003) reveals that the information and 
communications technology arm of the United Nations Development Program is advising 
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governments that want to move to open-source software on how FOSS could become the 
foundation for local software development. It would appear that FOSS is now a general trend. 
The Times cites the opinion of Samuel Guimaraes, Executive Secretary of Brazil’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, that “open-source, or free-to-share, software was crucial for the developing 
world because it would permit poorer countries to develop their own technology instead of 
having to import it” (Schenker, 2003, C4).  
        This comment by an influential Latin American official implies both that FOSS will 
rescue the developing countries from the mire of underdevelopment and that FOSS is an engine 
for the growth of the underdeveloped economy. Such implications should be viewed with caution, 
because the passionate desire for “development” has often furthered unequal relationships 
between nations. It is a mythical logic that never wants to consider a negative outcome in which 
the winner takes all. FOSS is only technology, despite its revolutionary and democratic 
potentialities. The idealistic concept that FOSS has its own independent path should be rejected, 
because technology is malleable, transmuting its form and substance at the command of human 
beings. 
       If a government is capable of understanding the ambiguous nature of such a technical 
artifact as FOSS, Guimaraes’ comment can be more than just a dream for a developing country. 
Increasing technological self-reliance and decreasing dependence on international vendors’ 
monopolies depends wholly on exploring a sustainable path of policy implementation, beyond 
the bounds of the privatized software model of an advanced country. This independence will be 
assisted by a two-pronged public policy: one prong is the community-based use of FOSS; the 
other is the use of free software for government departments and public sector entities. These 
two tactics will increase the popular use of FOSS. We can see how this works at the local in the 
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“telecenter project” in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The aim of the telecenter project is to provide marginal 
neighborhoods with free access to computer networks. To achieve the policy goal of a low-cost 
technology alternative and a high quality service, open source operating software such as Debian 
Linux was adopted as the underlying infrastructure technology. The city of Sao Paulo operates a 
total of 128 centers directly and each center provides free service to about 3,000 users (Dravis, 
2003, p. 13). This kind of community-based policy model has been gradually increasing around 
the world.  
Meanwhile, at the level of government and the public sector, the European Union, whose 
software industry has not lagged far behind that of the U.S., has a different concept about 
developing FOSS as its own business model. For instance, a well-known policy report entitled 
Free Software/Open Source: Information Society Opportunities for Europe? written by the EU’s 
Working Group on Libre Software (April 2000) centers around the anticipation of enormous 
economic profits. Although policies supporting FOSS can improve the software market, more 
significant, once again, is the establishment of a strong policy to implement FOSS in public and 
nonprofit sectors such as public administration, education, public health, defense departments, 
and so on (Forge, 2004). That the FOSS market policy “has sold its soul to the devil” can be seen 
in the evolution of open source-inspired networks accepted by technology vendors: over time, as 
de Laat (2004) notes, the application of the earlier FOSS model in industry has been displaced by 
the closed and limited model of corporate networks. For this reason, market-driven policy 
promoting the commercial use of FOSS may be more vulnerable to the control of proprietary 
companies than the policy of promoting FOSS use for public sector entities. 
To escape these dominant discourses of pursuing a business model of FOSS, the Korean 
government needs to investigate international experiments in FOSS policies, especially those of 
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    18 
 
some advanced European governments that focus on the philosophy of free software for the 
public good. Powerful FOSS policies in public sector entities are well-developed in Germany 
and France, while FOSS policies are increasing in England and Spain, and are marginal or just 
starting in Austria and Belgium. In particular, we should look at the German “BerliOS” project. 
This project, sponsored by the German Ministry of Economy and Technology 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie), is a Web-based FOSS service network that 
helps the German government to set up favorable conditions for FOSS users, developers, service 
providers, and small- to mid-sized manufacturers. The German government actively intervenes 
in the raising and investing of FOSS funds for the development and release of educational open 
source programs and for the revision of intellectual property laws to assure FOSS licensing 
within the copyright system. These various policy experiments of using free and open software at 
each level of government — central government, government departments, local authorities, and 
local communities — demonstrate the kind of public policy that is necessary in order to promote 
software use as a public good both to the economic system and to the public sector. 
 
Some Suggestions for a Desirable FOSS Policy 
 Germany’s application of FOSS suggests two directions in which the Korean government needs 
to move: First, the Korean government must be relatively free from international market 
conditions and from pressure from multinational software vendors; although a smaller power is 
typically accustomed to letting larger powers lead at the international level, the Korean 
government needs to assert its independence in the public policies related to international 
software trade. Second, as seen in the telecenter project in Brazil, FOSS policy should be based 
on encouraging the public welfare of the citizens. If the Korean government is willing to 
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consider FOSS as a significant software policy, it must focus on the philosophy of free software 
rather than the market-driven idea of software.  
        It is disheartening that the primary interest in Korea’s information policy so far has been 
in promoting the private market while relegating the public rights of citizens to the lowest 
priority. Desire for survival and competition within both local and global markets has induced 
policymakers to embrace a restrictive and exclusive view of owners’ property rights, rather than 
to find a middle ground of policy that balances various stakeholders’ interests. The government 
initiatives and legal structures surrounding information policy, which are closely related to the 
development of the domestic software scene, should not be skewed towards encouraging private 
rights under the banner of national informatization, and public rights to information should not 
be displaced by an emphasis on the rapid increase in the number of citizens using the new 
communication technologies. Such market-oriented policy decisions spring from the liberalist 
ethic that growth in the market will cure social problems in a “trickle-down” manner. The current 
FOSS policy is bound by the market-driven approach, and if the open source idea of intellectual 
collaboration is mainly used for remodeling business organizations to result in more monopolies, 
the new FOSS policy will just be another market incentive for protecting proprietary profits. It is 
instead vital for public policy to reduce the impact of the dominant software vendors that 
threaten the public welfare and to support legally and financially technological development for 
the citizens based on a participatory democratic model. 
FOSS policy is an exceptionally important experiment to see whether the Korean 
government can handle a controversial technical artifact so as to promote social justice or simply 
the interests of the monopolies. The strong point of FOSS is that it is an immature technology 
newly introduced in society. An emerging new technology may have a relative “degree of 
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freedom” (Hughes, 2001, p. 54) before reaching the later stage of “closure”, the stabilization of 
an artifact or its solidification (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). The malleable stage of technology is an 
intervention point where, in opposition to current neoclassical market policy, citizens could 
encourage government to regulate the brutal market mechanism embodied in the law of the 
jungle that “bigger is better.” Once the policy is solidified, it will be difficult to change. If 
citizens want to intervene in the power structure that is embedded in a technical artifact, this 
malleable stage of FOSS policy is the best time to embed social values in it before it falls into 
private hands once again. 
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Notes
                                                
1 The ambiguous position of the Korean government has arisen from international conflicts, mainly with the U.S., 
such as the politically, economically, and culturally complex controversies over whether to send peace-keeping 
troops to Iraq, whether to open the agricultural market to the global monopolies, and whether to preserve the 
“Screen Quota System” for encouraging domestic films. 
2 For instance, Microsoft’s Windows software controls the basic operations on more than 90 percent of all personal 
computers sold worldwide (Lohr, 2004). 
3 The following political gestures of Microsoft reflect its anxieties about FOSS as a bold challenger: an array of the 
“Shared Source Initiative Programs” in 2001, the “Trustworthy Computing Initiative” in 2002, and the “Government 
Security Program” in 2003. These “pseudo-open” Microsoft policies cannot halt the rise of FOSS in the global 
software market, but it has become clear that the defeat of FOSS is the ultimate goal of all of these Microsoft 
projects. Microsoft’s false declaration that it will ensure access to its programming code has, however, succeeded in 
persuading some government agencies, such as the Polish Defense Ministry and the London borough of Newham 
(Lohr, 2004). For detailed examples of Microsoft’s “dirty tricks” against FOSS applications in developing countries, 
see Fuller (2003).  
4 The nearly 300-page policy report was written by a working group of government, business, and academic leaders 
that met from June 12 to October 31, 2002. The report supports FOSS because of its potential to enhance South 
Korea’s international competitiveness and to revitalize the domestic software market. The working group consisted 
of 19 members with three subgroups, accredited from the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Korea IT 
Industry Promotion Agency, the Program Deliberation and Mediation Committee, GNU Korea, Korea Sun 
Microsystems, several government-sponsored research centers, and some universities.  
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    22 
 
References 
de Laat, P. B. (2004), “Evolution of open source networks in industry”, The Information Society, 
Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 291-299. 
Dravis, P. (2003), Open Source Software: Perspectives for development, infoDev., available at: 
http://www.infodev.org  
Evans, D. S. (2002), “Politics and programming: government preferences for promoting open 
source software”, in Hahn, R. W. (Ed.), Government Policy toward Open Source 
Software, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington DC, pp. 34-49. 
Evans, D. S., and Reddy, B. J. (2002), “Government preferences for promoting open-source 
software: A solution in search of a problem”, 9 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 313. 
available at:  http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/evans.pdf  
Forge, S. (2004), “Towards an EU policy for open source software”, The IPTS Report. Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies, available at: 
http://www.jrc.es/home/report/english/articles/vol85/ICT3E856.htm 
Fugetta, A. (2003), “Open source software – an evaluation”, The Journal of Systems and Software, 
Vol. 66 No. 1, pp. 77-90. 
Fuller, T. (2003), “How Microsoft warded off rival”, New York Times, May 15, C1. 
Hahn, R. W. (2002), “Government policy toward open source software: an overview”, in Hahn, 
R. W. (Ed.), Government Policy toward Open Source Software, AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington DC, pp. 1-11. 
Hughes, T. (1987), “The Evolution of large technological systems”, in Bijker, W., Hughes, T. P. 
and Pinch, T. (Ed.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, pp. 51-82. 
Kim, J-S. (2003), “The open source policy is coming to the surface”, Hankyoreh, November 1. 
Lee, K-S. (in press), “The electronic fabric of resistance: a constructive network of online users 
and activists challenging a rigid copyright regime in Korea”, in Kidd, D., Rodriguez, C. 
and Stein, L. (Ed.), Making Our Media: Mapping Global Initiatives Toward a Democratic 
Public Sphere (Volume II: Citizens’ Movements and the Democratization of the Public 
Sphere), Hampton Press, Cresskill, NJ. 
Lee, K-S. (2005), “The momentum of control and autonomy: A local scene of peer-to-peer 
music-sharing technology”, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 27 No. 5, pp. 799-809. 
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    23 
 
Lessig, L. (2001), The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World, 
Random House, New York. 
Lohr, S. (2004), “Some Microsoft customers will get to see office code”, New York Times, 
September 20, C4. 
Lohr, S. (2004), “Next version of Windows for PC’s to ship in 2006”, New York Times, August 
28, B3. 
Majchrzak, A. (1984), Methods for Policy Research, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
Myung, S-E. (2003), “Korea launches a switch to open source”, CNET News.com, October 1, 
available at: http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-5084811.html  
National Computerization Agency (NCA). (2003), Informatization white paper 2003, NCA, 
Seoul. 
National Computerization Agency (NCA). (2002), Informatization white paper 2002, NCA, 
Seoul. 
Pavlicek, R. C. (2000), Embracing Insanity: Open source software development. Sams, 
Indianapolis, Indiana. 
Pinch, T. & Bijker, W. (1984), “The social construction of facts and artifacts: or how the 
sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other”, Social 
Studies of Science, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 339-441. 
Raymond, E. S. (1999), The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musing on Linux and open source by an 
accidental revolutionary, O’Reilly, Cambridge. 
Roberts, A. (2001), “Open source: the new, new economy”, Arena Magazine, pp. 21-23, available 
at: http://www.arena.org.au/archives/Mag_Archive/issue_51/features2_51.htm  
Seiferth, C. J. (1999), “Open source and these United States”, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 
Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 50-79.  
Schenker, J. L. (2003), “U.N. meeting debates software for poor nations”, New York Times, 
December 11. 
Smith, B. L. (2002), “The future of software: enabling the marketplace to decide”, in Hahn, R. W. 
(Ed.), Government Policy toward Open Source Software, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Washington DC, pp.69-86. 
Stallman, R. (2002), Free Software, Free Society: Selected essays of Richard M. Stallman, GNU 
Press, Free Software Foundation, Boston, MA. 
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    24 
 
Working Group on Libre Software. (2000), Free Software/Open Source: Information society 
opportunities for Europe? Version 1.2 (work in progress, April), available at:  
http://eu.conecta.it/paper/paper.html  
Yang, S-J. (2003), “Korea, China, Japan form open-source initiative: move by 3 Asian economies 
expected to send”, The Korea Herald, September 9.  
                                 The Public Policy for FOSS    25 
 
 
 
 
 
  
